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I. INTRODUCTION
―[P]roperty is not a right; it is a social function,‖1 wrote the French
law professor Léon Duguit in 1912 when publishing a famous series of
lectures he delivered in Buenos Aires the year before. This statement
and Duguit’s work signaled a transformation in the way that property
* Associate Dean of International and Graduate Studies, Professor of Law and founding
faculty member, FIU College of Law, Miami; Fulbright Scholar, Pontificia Universidad Católica
de Valparaiso, Chile; Membre Associé, Centre Georges Chevrier (UMR – 5605 Université de
Bourgogne/CNRS), Dijon, France. J.D., Cornell Law School; Ph.D. (law), Cambridge
University; Ph.D. (law), Leiden University. The author thanks Troy Elder, Lillian Aponte
Miranda, Ediberto Román, Kerri Stone, Howard Wasserman, and Carlton Waterhouse for their
comments and Pierre Bodineau and Alain Wijffels for their many kindnesses in Dijon. He
thanks Deans Acosta, Guzmán Brito, and Strickman for their support.
1. ―Mais la propriété n’est pas un droit; elle est une fonction sociale.‖ LÉON DUGUIT,
LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON 21 (2d ed.
1920) [hereinafter DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS].
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would be understood in the Euro-American world. The statement led to
the idea of what is now commonly called the ―social-obligation norm‖
or the ―social-function norm‖ of property. In essence, the idea of the
social-obligation norm of property is that ―[p]roperty rights should have
their share of social responsibility.‖2 These ideas contrasted with the
dominant conception of property as an absolute right in which the
owner is free to do or not to do whatever the owner likes with the
property. Duguit’s characterization of private property limits it by
requiring a minimum level of social utility beyond which property no
longer exists. The scope of the social-obligation norm has varied in
practice and has been subject to the personal or political interests of
those charged with administering programs rooted in its understanding
of property. Notions of the norm have been used to justify the
expropriation and redistribution of property through land reform
programs, the reshaping of cities through urban planning, the imposition
of rent controls on landlords, and other limitations on the use of
property by its owner.
Today, scholars frequently cite Duguit as the founder of the socialfunction norm.3 These references, however, seldom go beyond a quick
cite to his foundational work on the topic. It seems that little is known
about the genesis of his ideas, the sources he employed, and how some
of these ideas eventually migrated into contemporary legal systems
around the world.4 This Article seeks to explore the origins of Duguit’s
2. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 31 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Thomas T. Ankerson & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social
Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (2006); Raymond
R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 20 n.23 (1998); Charles A. Hale, The Civil Law Tradition and
Constitutionalism in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The Legacy of Emilio Rabasa, 18 LAW & HIST.
REV. 275 (2000); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Property Rights Protection Act: Does
it Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 701 (1996); MATTEI, supra note 2,
at 33; David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privitization: An Inquiry into the
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 92 (2000).
Although the most influencial source for these ideas, Duguit was not alone in spreading such
views. See, e.g., José Ramón Narváez Hernández, El Código Privado-social: Influencia de
Francesco Cosentini en el Código Civil Mexicano de 1928, 16 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 201-26 (2004).
4. Historians of law and politics in Europe are so familiar with the notion of property’s
social function that the topic seems to them better suited to a set piece for undergraduate
examination rather than an area to be re-examined and explored. The early sources and ideas
concerning broadly what is ―the social‖ are the building blocks of the modern European social
welfare state. They are viewed as teleology rather than history, and to study them places the
scholar, particulary the foreign scholar, within the camp of apologists for the modern European
social welfare state and its policies. Likewise, in Latin America, the social-function norm of
constitutional property is so common and so familiar that it has received little notice as a
regional phenomenon.
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thought on the topic as some necessary background work to the current
debate concerning the social function of property.
Duguit’s redefinition of property is one instance of the wider trend
of the globalization of ―The Social‖ within law and legal thought noted
by Duncan Kennedy.5 This view of property has led to many offshoots,
including the reconsideration of intellectual property rights in
relationship to the needs of society, the World Charter of Rights to the
City, and Ugo Mattei’s ideas of a Latin American resistance to neoliberalism through a redefinition of property. 6 Brazil has been
particularly active in expanding these ideas. It has created an
―environmental-function‖ norm of property in its Civil Code of 2002, as
well as developing a social-function limitation on, not property, but
contract.7
The social-obligation norm of property stands in stark contrast to the
classically liberal notions of property found in the Anglo-American
tradition. This classical view is expressed well by F.H. Lawson and
Bernard Rudden who write:
In principle, owners can do anything they like with what they
own: use it, use it up, neglect it, destroy it, give it away entirely
or for a time, lend it, sell or lease it, pledge it, leave it by will,
and so on. Furthermore the owner is perfectly free to do nothing
at all with the thing: in principle, the law of property imposes no
positive duties on an owner.8
For modern property scholars, William Blackstone is often viewed
as the predominant spokesperson for a conception of property in which

5. Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 649-74 (2003).
6. Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in
Brazil and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2006) (on the social function
of property and the social function of the city and the World Charter on the Right to the City);
Ugo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil Code, Property and Plunder. Time For a Latin American
Alliance to Resist the Neo Liberal Order, 5 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS art. 3,1 (arguing that the
countries of Latin America should ―unite to develop a new social constitution of Property‖);
David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83-109 (2000).
7. Luciano Benetti Timm, As Origens do Contracto no novo Código Civil: Uma
Introdução à Função Social, Ao Welfarismo e ao Solidarismo Contratual (on file with author);
Flavia Santinoni Vera, The Social Function of Property Rights in Brazil, 2006 LATIN AMERICAN
AND CARIBBEAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (ALACDE) ANNUAL PAPERS, available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/bple/alacde/34 (describing effects of social function of property
rights born in the Brazilian Constitution on the national economy).
8. F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 2002)
(emphasis in original).
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the owner has ―sole and despotic dominion‖ over property.9 Blackstone
has become inextricably linked to this definition of property despite
recent scholarship revealing the complexity of Blackstone’s ideas on the
topic.10
The idea of the social-obligation norm of property is experiencing a
renaissance in American legal thought.11 Gregory Alexander, a forceful
advocate of the social-obligation norm, sounds a clarion call, ―[t]he time
has come for property scholars to come to grips with the socialobligation norm. . . . It is high time for property scholars to begin
developing a social-obligation theory.‖12 As a corollary to the call, a
recent ―Statement of Progressive Property‖ asserts that ―[w]e must look
to the underlying human values that property serves and the social
relationships it shapes and reflects.‖13 This Statement and the
accompanying articles that form a law review symposium on the topic
mark an important step in work of many scholars on the topic. They
seek to appreciate and to strengthen this social-obligation understanding
of property and to replace conceptions of property derived from an
absolutist view and the economic analysis of legal institutions.14 In fact,
9. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed.
1979) (1765-69), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-201.htm.
10. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 754 (2009) (citing Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or
Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-06 (1998) and David B. Schorr, How Blackstone
Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 103 (2009), available at
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/art5).
11. There are a number of terms for the same idea including the ―social-function norm of
property,‖ ―the social-function doctrine,‖ and sometimes the more general term, ―constitutional
property.‖ The term ―social property‖ has a somewhat different meaning. See supra text
accompanying notes 3-7. This Article uses both adjectives, ―social-obligation‖ and ―socialfunction,‖ to mean the same thing. North American literature tends to use ―social-obligation,‖
while ―social-function‖ is a closer rendering of the original French terminology.
12. Alexander, supra note 10, at 819.
13. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743 (2009).
14. SPECIAL ISSUE ON PROPERTY AND OBLIGATION, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743-1071 (2009).
Among these scholars, Gregory Alexander has been at the forefront of the effort. His fullest
treatment of the topic entitled The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for
American Takings Jurisprudence has been received with acclaim. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE
GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE (2006) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE]; see M.C. Mirow, [Dear
Justice Scalia], 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147-55 (2008) (reviewing ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL
DEBATE). The term ―constitutional property‖ sits between the worlds of public law and private
law for those schooled in civil law systems prevalent in Europe and Latin America. The very
phrase ―constitutional property‖ indicates the liminal quality of the inquiry: ―constitution‖
signals public law; ―property‖ signals private law. Those trained in the common law will be less
concerned about the term and its apparent self-contradictory aspects. The coinage, however, is
appropriate because in much of the common law world, the social-function obligation of
property is largely unknown. While questions of property’s social function often arise in the
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these efforts offer a well-considered response to the dominant law and
economics analysis that so many property professors and lawyers were
raised on.15
So fully developed is the modern dialogue on the social-obligation
norm that scholars working in the field are apt to forget that the idea has
a long intellectual history, and in 2010, we are celebrating the
centennial of the clearest articulation of property’s social function. This
new way of looking at property, the social-function model of property,
was introduced in 1910 by the French doctoral student Henri Hayem,
and a few years later, it was widely disseminated by Duguit. As
Blackstone represents ―despotic ownership,‖ so Duguit has come to
represent property’s ―social function.‖
The idea of property’s social function travelled the world following
Duguit’s lectures in 1911 and their subsequent publication. In South
America, Duguit’s lectures in Buenos Aires served to link his work and
ideas to the legal development of the region. Based on Duguit’s work,
drafters of Latin American constitutions changed the way property was
defined in the first decades of the twentieth century. Before this regional
shift, most constitutions followed classically liberal definitions of
property as expressed in the French Civil Code and as found in the
United States. Under this earlier view, property was absolute and
subject only to the absolute power and arbitrary whim of the owner. The
newer view considers property as having or as being defined by a social
function.16 For example, evincing the influence of Duguit, the Chilean
Constitution of 1925 states that ―[t]he exercise of the right of property is
subject to the limitations or rules that the maintenance of the progress of
the social order require.‖17 A more recent example is the Bolivian
Constitution of 1993 which provides that everyone has a fundamental
right to ―private property, individually or collectively, as long as it
fulfills a social function.‖18 Similarly, the Constitution of El Salvador of
context of constitutional provisions addressing property, we must remember that the idea was
also expressed in civil codes and classically private-law materials. Sometimes the debate was
framed around the efficacy of code provisions that upheld liberal ideas of property and its use in
the face of social definitions found in proposed or newly promulgated constitutional texts.
15. Any first-year student of property reading Dukeminier’s standard text will have been
exposed to the law and economics framework. The most recent edition is JESSE DUKEMINIER ET
AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006). See generally MATTEI, supra note 2. For the social-obligation
norm as a response to law and economics, see Alexander, supra note 10, at 750-51.
16. M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN SPANISH AMERICA 205-06 (2004) [hereinafter MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW]. The book’s
text is wrong in stating that the Colombian Constitution of 1886 declared that ―Property is a
social function that implies obligations.‖ It was, in fact, the 1936 amendment to the Constitution
of 1886 that added this language. Artículo 10, Acto Legislativo No. 1, Aug. 5, 1936.
17. Chilean Constitution (1925), art. 10(10).
18. Bolivian Constitution (1993), art. 7(1).
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1983 provides ―[t]he right to private property in its social function is
recognized and guaranteed.‖19 The idea has found expression
throughout the world,20 the Constitutions of Germany and South Africa
are prime examples of modern documents that embrace the social
function.21
In North America, Duguit’s ideas became known to the legal
community when some of his work was translated and published by
Harold Laski, an important English professor of political thought who
lectured widely at McGill, Yale, and Harvard from 1914 to 1920.22 In
fact, Laski’s translations of Duguit were published in New York.23
Other works by Duguit were also translated and published in the United
States.24 Through Laski and on their own, the works of Duguit found
their way into the main body of American jurisprudence as ideas to be
considered and reckoned with.25 Recent scholars working on this idea of
property and related aspects in the United States include Gregory
Alexander, Eric Freyfogle, Rebecca Lubens, Eduardo Peñalver,
Jedediah Purdy, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, among
others.26 Although the social-obligation norm has not been a dominant
strand of understanding property in the United States, the idea that
property has a civic or public side has been present in the United States
since its founding.27
19. El Salvador Constitution (1983), art. 103. See generally Ankersen & Ruppert, supra
note 3.
20. Joseph R. Thome, Land Rights and Agrarian Reform: Latin American and South
African Perspectives, Paper presented at Seminar on Good Government and Law, London, 27
Mar. 1995 (copy on file with author).
21. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE, supra note 14, at 11-13, 97-197. See Rebecca
Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of German and U.S. Law,
24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389 (2007).
22. J.L. MONEREO PEREZ, LA DEMOCRACIA EN CRISIS: HAROLD J. LASKI 43-45 (Marceló,
Barcelona: El Viejo Topo 2004) (on the influence of Duguit on Laski’s thought). See also
Harold J. Laski, A Note on M. Duguit, 31 HARV. L. REV. 186 (1917).
23. See generally LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (Frida Laski & Harold Laski
trans., New York 1919).
24. Léon Duguit, Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty, Contract, Liability, and
Property, reprinted in 11 THE CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES, THE PROGRESS OF
CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 135 (Layton Bartol Register & Ernest
Bruncken trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1969) (1918). This work was reviewed by
Roscoe Pound in 34 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1920) (making particular note of the social function of
property).
25. Jeremy Paul, Felix Cohen’s Brand of Legal Realism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 597 (2006); 1
ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 181, 184-89 (1959); 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 138 (1959).
26. Alexander, supra note 10, at 747-48 nn.6 & 7. See also Lubens, supra note 21, at 389.
27. Alexander, supra note 10, at 748; see generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
1776-1970 (1997); see also Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of
Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 228-30 (1993).
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Before turning to Duguit and his theory, a brief mention concerning
terminology and translation is necessary. The roots of the socialfunction norm lie in France. Writing in English about French ideas
presents some difficulties in legal terminology and comparative law.
―Propriété‖ in French can mean both ―ownership‖ and ―property.‖28
The most common word for ―property‖ in its legal sense in French is
―les biens.‖29 When translating French writers, the sense of particular
phrases would often dictate that it would be better to render the word as
―ownership;‖ thus, the phrase ―ownership is a social function‖ is more
easily understood than ―property is a social function‖ to most English
speakers. Indeed, Joseph Singer captures the French idea nicely when
he writes, ―Owners have obligations; they have always had
obligations.‖30 Nonetheless, the developed English secondary literature
on the topic prefers the term ―property‖ to render the French word
―propriété.‖ For consistency, particularly consistency in ideas, I have
decided to perpetuate this somewhat minor error or ambiguity. In
English, the social-function norm or the social-function obligation has
been tied to the word ―property‖ and recently to the phrase
―constitutional property.‖ To write more correctly about the French
ideas of the ―social function of ownership,‖ would convey a clearer
meaning of the idea. If we were to focus on ―ownership‖ rather than
―property,‖ the human instrumentality of ownership would more clearly
connect the activity of owning property to societal obligations.
Nonetheless, the term ―social function of property‖ is used here because
the English-language scholarship has already settled on ―property‖ and
to introduce the minor correction of ―ownership‖ would, I think, create
needless confusion.
II. LÉON DUGUIT
Léon Duguit was born in 1859 in Libourne, France, about 20 miles
northeast of Bordeaux, where he spent his early years. He then studied
law at the University of Bordeaux and rose swiftly in the academic
world. By 1880 he had obtained his first law degree, a doctorate through
competition, and had received a dispensation for his young age to begin
preparing for the agrégation which he later obtained in 1882. His first
teaching position was at the University of Caen, where he taught legal

28. OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY 654 (2d ed. 1997).
29. JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, HISTORIE DU DROIT DES BIENS (2008); OXFORD-HACHETTE
FRENCH DICTIONARY 1591 (2d ed. 1997).
30. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 18 (2000),
cited in Alexander, supra note 10, at 818.
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history.31 With Edmond Villey, he founded a review on political
economy at the University of Caen, Revue d’economie politique. In
1886, he returned to the University of Bordeaux, his academic home for
the next forty years.32
In Bordeaux, Duguit held regular meetings with academic friends.
Importantly for our study of Duguit’s social thought, Émile Durkheim
was among these close friends from whom Duguit borrowed and
applied various approaches to law. Establishing his place as a professor
of constitutional law, Duguit published his first article in 1896 in the
Revue de droit public. It was, however, his two-volume publication on
the state, l’État, in 1901 and 1903, that gave him national prominence
and set the structure for his future works. Over the next decade, he held
various positions at the University of Coimbra, the University of Cairo,
and at the École des Hautes Études Sociales and continued to publish
regularly. From 1911 forward, he published several major works
including his lectures in Buenos Aires and a five-volume work on
constitutional law, Traité de droit constitutionnel. He was active in
university life, local politics, and for social causes within the city and
region. He was a member of the Union for Truth, a Dreyfus society, and
attended meetings of the Cercle Voltaire.33
During the First World War, Duguit served as an administrator in the
army and ran a military hospital. He lost one of his two sons in the war.
In the 1920s, Duguit continued with his academic work and with several
visiting positions abroad: Columbia University in New York in 1920
and 1921, the University of Coimbra in 1923, and the University of
Bucharest in 1925. In 1926, with Hans Kelsen and Franz Weyr, he
founded an international review of legal theory, the Revue
internationale de théorie du droit, and in 1927, he participated in the
founding of the International Institute for Public Law. He died in
1928.34
In 1911 over the course of two months, Léon Duguit, this wellknown French law professor and author, delivered a series of lectures in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. The topic, how the civil law had changed
since the Code Napoléon of 1804, was an opportunity for Duguit to
bridge the intellectual traditions of France and Argentina and of Europe
and America. He flattered his audience of Argentines by noting that
they were the professional elite of the country and that the topic was
31. DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES JURISTES FRANÇAIS XIIE-XXE SIÈCLE 271 (Patrick
Arabeyre et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter DHJF].
32. Id. at 271-72.
33. Id. at 272.
34. Id. For additional biographical information, see José Luis Monereo Pérez & José
Calvo González, Léon Diguit (1859-1928): Jurista de una Sociedad en Transformación, 4
REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483-86 (2005).
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appropriate because their respective countries had come, more or less,
to the same level of civilization.35 One might speculate that this was
exactly what a room full of Argentines at the beginning of the twentieth
century would have delighted in.
The lectures were an opportunity of another sort. Duguit used the
series to expound and advocate a new view of private law and of
property. Duguit’s discussion of property, the sixth and final lecture in
the series, was the most important, controversial, and lasting part of the
lectures. Duguit transcribed and published the lectures in Paris just a
few months after their delivery in Buenos Aires; a second Paris edition
appeared in 1920.36 In his preface to the second edition, Duguit
summarized the argument he proposed: ―In the sixth lecture, I have
developed the idea that capitalist property, and particularly real
property, is increasingly less of a subjective individual right and more
of a social function.‖37
He repeated the essential language of the sixth lecture this way:
―Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the social
function of the possessor of wealth.‖38 He coined two hyphenated words
to describe the old notion of property or ownership and the new: rightproperty (propriété-droit) and function-property (propriété-fonction).39
This lecture and its subsequent circulation in France, the United
States, and Latin America provided the most important source by
Duguit concerning the social function doctrine of property, now
commonly called the social-obligation norm of property. North
American scholars examining the nature of property referred to it.40
Latin American constitutionalist reconsidering the definition of property
in their constitutions also referred to it.41 Writing later in 1923, Duguit
made it clear that he considered this lecture in 1911 as the origin of his
assertions concerning the social function of property.42 Although other
35. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at i.
36. Id. There were also editions of the work in Spanish published in Madrid in 1915 and
1926. Hale, supra note 3, at 276, n.45. Another author mentioned a Spanish translation from
1921. Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 488 n.15, 546.
37. ―J’ai, dans la sixième conférence, développé cette idée que la propriété capitaliste, et
particulièrement la propriété foncière, cesse de plus en plus d’ être un droit subjectif de
l’individu pour devenir une fonction sociale.‖ DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at
iv.
38. ―La propriété n’est plus le droit subjectif du propriétaire ; elle est la fonction sociale
de détenteur de la richesse.‖ Id. at v.
39. Id. at vi.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
41. An early example from Chile, ACTAS OFICIALES DE LAS SESIONES CELEBRADAS POR
LA COMISIÓN Y SUB-COMISION ENCARGADAS DEL ESTUDIO DEL PROYECTO DE NUEVA
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 114-19 (1925).
42. LÉON DUGUIT, 3 TRATÉ DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 619 (2d ed. 1923) (Paris,
Fontemoing & cie, 1911) [hereinafter DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL].
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works of Duguit and French thinkers contributed to the shift, this sixth
lecture transplanted the French roots of the social function of property
into foreign soil in many countries around the world.
This radical, new definition of property was not an isolated
statement but arose in the context of Duguit’s life work, and it must be
read in the context of both the six lectures he delivered in Argentina and
of his work on the social function up to its dissemination abroad.
Duguit’s view of the state was that its goal was not to exercise
imperium, but rather to fulfill its social function to collective service.43
All other lesser institutions, such as legal obligations or property, should
also fulfill this general function. Duguit’s assertions about the socialfunction norm of property were, in fact, a very small slice of his much
larger life’s work on the nature and function of the state. It was not,
however, a deviation or detour from this work. Duguit’s view of
property fit in with his overall theory of the state. His ideas also took on
a later significance that neither Duguit nor his contemporaries could
have expected.44
Duguit can be correctly viewed as one of the French anti-formalists
who rejected the deductive science of an autonomous law so prevalent
in nineteenth-century Europe.45 With the aim of establishing the limits
of the state by law, he sought to apply the more empirically based
analyses of the social sciences to law.46 The writings of Herbert Spencer
strongly influenced his early writings on the law and state, and Duguit
used such biological and organic approaches to analyze the function and
change of law and the state. Although he later left this school of
thought, Duguit kept certain central aspects of this approach throughout
his academic life. These included an empirically based scientific
methodology and a core belief in the value of sociological modes of
understanding law and the state.47
Despite its assertions of realist and scientific approach, the body of
Duguit’s work to the modern reader appears to be deeply imbedded in
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophical
43. DHJF, supra note 31, at 273.
44. Roger Bonnard, Léon Duguit: Ses Oeuvres, Sa Doctrine, 46 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L’ÉTRANGER 5, 16-17 (Marcel Giard ed., 1929).
45. Mauricio García-Villegas, Comparative Sociology of Law: Legal Fields, Legal
Scholarship, and Social Sciences in Europe and the United States, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 34956 (2006); Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 648-51 (1993). With Saleilles and Hauriou, Duguit is considered one of the great theorists
of the French school of legal objectivism. Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 543 n.150 (citing
G. GURVITCH, L’IDÉE DU DROIT SOCIAL. NOTION ET SYSTÈME DU DROIT SOCIAL. HISTOIRE
DOCTRINALE DEPUIS XVII SIÈCLE JUSQU ´ À LA FIN DU XIX SIÈCLE 591-710 (Paris, Recueil Sirey
1932)).
46. DHJF, supra note 31, at 272; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 508-09.
47. Bonnard, supra note 44, at 8-11.
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discussions of the nature of law and of the nature of the state. It was this
work that his contemporaries found most important and interesting.48
Indeed, on Duguit’s death, one of his colleagues, Roger Bonnard also of
Bordeaux, stated of him: ―I am persuaded that the day will come when
one will think of two great periods in the science of the law: one before
him, the other after him.‖49 While not attached to Duguit’s name, this
was certainly a transformative period in methodological approaches to
law, and in some ways, Bonnard’s prophesy was correct. Duguit was at
the center of a critique and reconceptualization of the commonly held
ideas about both public and private law.50
Thus, using his positivist, realist approach, most of Duguit’s work
can be characterized as critiquing existing theories and understandings
of the law and the state. In many respects, Duguit’s targets were defined
by the existing literature. Duguit took on what he considered the
metaphysical assumptions, rather than the scientific conclusions, about
law expressed in contemporary works by Rudolf von Ihering and Georg
Jellinek. Notions of subjective rights were not supported by the
conclusions Duguit obtained through his positivist method. In addition
to rejecting the accepted idea of subjective rights, Duguit also
reconsidered the predominant idea that juridical acts were the result of
assertions of the wills of the authors of the act, or what was commonly
called the Willenstheorie. In Duguit’s view, metaphysical ideas about
the law and critiques of them had to follow from empirical scientific
observations about the law, rather than precede such observations.51
Thus, Duguit’s realist approach critiqued the current notions of
subjective rights, the will theory of juridical acts, the auto limitation of
the state, and the schools of natural and contractarian law as represented
in divine will and social contract theories of the state and law.52
Following Émile Durkheim, the preeminent French sociological thinker
of the period, Duguit sought legal rules that reflected social rules and
social interdependence, or solidarity, leading to his analysis of the social
state and the rule of law—the true legitimacy for government.53
Duguit’s thought in general and on the social function of property in
relationship to social solidarity and social interdependence was guided
strongly by the works of Comte and Durkheim.54 In fact, France was
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id.
50. García-Villegas, supra note 45, at 349-56.
51. Bonnard, supra note 44, at 13-15, 18-19, 24-32, 42.
52. DHJF, supra note 31, at 272; Bonnard, supra note 44, at 38; Pérez & González, supra
note 34, at 516-34.
53. DHJF, supra note 31, at 272; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 509-10, 534-45.
54. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW & POLITICAL THOUGHT 107-111 (Oxford, Oxford
University Press 1992); Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 484.
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fertile ground for the development of Duguit’s ideas related to the social
function of property. The fifty years leading up to Duguit’s work had
witnessed the rise of a school of social thinkers and writers. The broad
ideas of ―solidarity,‖ stemming from the writings of the Swiss religious
philosopher Charles Secrétan were added to social aspects by the
French jurist and political philosopher Léon Victor Bourgeois who more
fully developed the idea of ―social solidarity‖ around the turn of the
century.55 Charles Gide was also instrumental in the development of
these ideas.56 Thus, in addition to maintaining a sociological approach
borrowed from Durkheim, Duguit also adopted Durkheim’s idea of
―social solidarity‖ as a central principle for his ideas concerning the law
and the state.57 Nonetheless, his unwillingness to adopt the idea of the
collective conscience, an important aspect of Durkheim’s approach, was
a substantial departure from Durkheim’s thought.58 Duguit also cited
and quoted Comte as a central influence on his development of the
social-function norm.59 Indeed, Duguit’s very method of observation
and continued observation has its origin in Comte’s positivism.60
One aspect of such an approach was the collapsing of the traditional
distinction between private and public law, a set feature of the civil law
since Roman times.61 Just as assumptions concerning subjective rights
could not be supported in the area of public law, they could not be
supported in private law.62 This idea was not widely accepted, and
Duguit received criticism from those who defended the more traditional
German doctrine, such as Raymond Carré de Malberg, and from
classical jurists, such as the legal historian Adhémar Esmein and his
colleague at Bordeaux, Julien Bonnecase.63 His debates on the nature of
law with Maurice Hauriou of Toulouse, who upheld more traditional
objective notions of law, have been chronicled.64 Because he refused to
55. Andreas Timmermann, “Soziale Solidarität” und Agrarreform im 20.
Jahrhundert:zur Wirkung der Rechtsschule Léon Duguits—ein Überseeischer Vergleich, 37
VERFASSUNG UND RECHT ÜBERSEE 168, 172 (2004).
56. Id. at 172-73; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 539-40.
57. Bonnard, supra note 44, at 36.
58. Id.
59. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 159; 1 DUGUIT, DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 268 (citing AUGUSTE COMTE, SYSTÈME DE POLITIQUE
POSITIVE 156 (Paris, Larousse 1892)); DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 61819 (quoting a passage from COMTE, supra).
60. POUND, supra note 25, at 186-87.
61. DHJF, supra note 31, at 273; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 495-96.
62. Bonnard, supra note 44, at 16.
63. DHJF, supra note 31, at 273.
64. Id. See C. Eisenmann, Deux Théoriciens du droit: Duguit et Hauriou, REVUE
PHILOSOPHIQUE 231-79 (1930); M. Milet, L. Duguit et M. Hauriou: Quarante ans de
Controverse Juridico-politique. Essai D’analyse Socio-rhétorique (1889-1929) in LES JURISTES
FACE AU POLITIQUE : LE DROIT, LA GAUCHE, LA DOCTRINE SUR LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE 85-
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accept the notion of a collective conscience, Duguit was even pushed
aside by other disciples of Durkheim, who otherwise would have made
up his natural intellectual circle. Duguit’s positions on the law were not
static throughout his life; for example, after 1914 he amended his ideas
concerning the goals of positive law to include the attainment of justice,
a shift that led some to categorize his views as espousing ideas of
natural law. Despite his sometimes controversial positions, he left an
important mark on the teaching of public law at Bordeaux from whence
several of his students went on to academic distinction.65 When Duguit
delivered and published these lectures in 1911 and 1912, he was already
well established as a law professor at the University of Bordeaux and as
one of France’s premiere minds in the area of public law. Thus, the
lectures reflect the confident work of a maturing scholar, then in his
early fifties.
III. THE BUENOS AIRES LECTURES
The lectures provide us the best window into Duguit’s thought on
the social function of property. In his Buenos Aires lectures, Duguit
argued that private law had recently undergone a transformation from a
metaphysical and individualist system to a realist and social (réaliste et
socialiste) system.66 He effectively and repeatedly returned to this
theme in the course of his six lectures entitled: (1) Subjective Rights
and the Social Function; (2) The New Conception of Liberty; (3) The
Autonomy of the Will; (4) The Juridical Act; (5) The Contract and
Responsibility; and (6) The Social Function of Property. Although it is
unlikely Duguit would have expected the sixth lecture on property’s
social function to have created the most interest, by the time of the
second publication of the lectures in 1920, Duguit’s preface to the
second edition focused on this topic. He used the second preface to
restate his case for the social-function norm and to set out several
examples of laws enacted after his lecture, from 1916, 1918, and 1919,
to illustrate the growth of the norm. One set of laws, the loi Méline
required the cultivation of farmland when the owners of the land refused
to grow crops. Aimed at farmers who had been mobilized for war, the

121 (Carlos Miguel Herrera ed. 2003); M. Waline, Les Idées Maîtrisses de deux Grand
Publicistes Français: Léon Duguit et Maurice Hauriou, L’ANNÉE POLITIQUE 16 (Nov. 1929).
For a recent discussion of their differences, see Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 505-08.
65. DHJF, supra note 31, at 273.
66. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 8-9. To avoid an ambiguity Duguit
himself addressed, I use the term ―social‖ to translate his term ―socialiste‖ which he made clear
was not aligned with the socialist party and its political and economic aims. Id. at 8.
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act reflected Duguit’s ideas of the social function.67 The implementation
of the law, however, appears to have been impractical.68 Another law
forced the continuation of urban leases and required a limitation on
increases of rents.69 In hindsight, the lectures can be read as leading to
this final and most important topic within the context of the series, and
Duguit might have planned that the series would culminate in the
lecture on property as a new and controversial topic.
The first lecture was both an introduction to the general theme of the
transformation in the law and an introduction to Duguit’s method.
Duguit asserted that his approach embodied a scientific, impartial
observation of the law without predetermined conclusions.70 He stated
that the changes making up this transformation were more or less
universal to all American and European countries ―at the same level of
civilization, and in any case all the countries of Latin America.‖71
In Duguit’s story of legal development and change in these
countries, the Declaration of Rights of Man (1789) and the Code
Napoléon (1804) were not heroes. Instead, these formative documents
of western law enshrined a metaphysical, individual, and resultant
formalist approach to law based on the power of the individual will and
subjective rights.72 They enshrined this approach to law by making
property a right and by making the enjoyment of that right the most
absolute possible.73 The new transformation, the social function of law,
was a reaction against the concept of law found in these documents.74
Duguit’s new, realist, social view of law and legal institutions shunned
these earlier notions of rights found throughout Europe, and, as
mentioned by Duguit, in the Argentine Civil Code of the period.75
Under the former framework, the state became the protector of
individual rights.76 In Duguit’s view, this obscured the more important
function of the state to promote the place of humans in society.77
Instead, Duguit suggests that subjective rights should have been and
were replaced by the social function.78 The first lecture concluded with

67. Id. at vii-ix.
68. HALPÉRIN, supra note 29, at 308.
69. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 9, 12.
70. Id. at 2.
71. ―[C]e sont tous les pays américains et européens parvenus au même degré de
civilisation, et en tout cas tous les pays d’origine latine.‖ Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 8-11.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 19.
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brief examples demonstrating how the social function redefined liberty
and property.79
The second lecture developed the idea of liberty. Repeating the
tropes of social function and a realist and social conception of law,
Duguit called on the work of his ―eminent colleague and friend‖
Durkheim to emphasize the importance of social solidarity and social
interdependence.80 The individual was properly placed as a member of
society and was to carry out his or her social function. Drawing on
Comte to assert this idea, Duguit expanded on these ideas to situate law
and legal institutions in society.81 To describe the social function
further, Duguit first set out more fully the elements of the traditional
civil system that he hoped was being abandoned. According to Duguit,
the essential elements of this traditional system also provided the
overall general structure of his lectures. The four element are individual
liberty, an inviolable right of property, contract, and individual
responsibility for fault.82 Against this structure, Duguit placed the
individual’s role in society.83 Using examples drawn from laws
regarding suicide, dueling, and regulating working hours, Duguit
demonstrated that the social function had modified or limited more
established notions of liberty and freedom of contract.84
In his third lecture, Duguit attacked the relationship of the autonomy
of the will theory of law to juridical acts.85 Such a theory might have
worked for individualist societies like ancient Rome or Europe and
America in the early nineteenth century, but Duguit saw European and
American societies of the early twentieth century as defined by their
social and associational character.86 He critiqued a substantial body of
French and German writings on legal personality to argue that the social
reality no longer reflected such assumptions.87 Duguit’s world now was
filled with corporations, associations, societies, and public utilities all
easily carrying the fiction of juridical persons.88 Just as individuals must
fulfill social missions, so too must these various groups serve a social
function.89 Duguit found that the autonomy of their collective wills,

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30-33.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38-51.
Id. at 52-58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-60.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 73-74.
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really an individual will in Duguit’s thought, was inconsistent with the
new realist and social function he observed.90
In the fourth lecture, Duguit turned to the juridical act as an
expression of the autonomy of will.91 His first examples were taken
from contract law and how the social function had modified the
traditional understanding of contractual relationship. Duguit stated that
internal acts of the will were not protected by law; only those
declarations of will that produce social acts were protected.92 Therefore,
when codes enforce only licit contracts, an element of the social is
introduced to limit the will of the individual. Duguit used contracts to
establish brothels, loans for betting, and bequests contingent on not
marrying as examples where the social function voided the will of the
individual.93 In the other direction, he found examples where bequests
that would normally be void were enforced as valid because of their
clear social purposes. These included the founding of hospitals and the
famous case of Edmond de Goncourt’s will that established a literary
society in the Goncourt name.94
Duguit continued to address contracts in the fifth lecture and added a
discussion of torts, or civil responsibility for negligent acts. The famous
French civilian Planiol is introduced as a staunch defender of an
individualist, autonomist will approach to contract.95 To counter this
view of contract, Duguit noted the rise of contracts of adhesion, the
ambiguous legal nature of posting a letter, collective contracts for work,
and government concessions, all as instances that increasingly
challenged the traditional two-wills theory of contract.96 For Duguit,
these new contractual relationships were best seen as representing the
social function. In the area of tort law, Duguit also asserted a shift from
individual to group responsibility reflecting the new social function of
law.97 Here, Duguit pointed to workers’ compensation schemes that
functioned irrespective of fault and the new areas of responsibility
assumed by public services when damages occurred.98

90. Id. at 81.
91. Id. at 82-83.
92. Id. at 92-93.
93. Id. at 96-100.
94. Id. at 107-13. The work of the Academie Goncourt continues today through its
prestigious Goncourt awards. See Academie Goncourt website, www.academie-goncourt.fr.
95. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 117-19.
96. Id. at 121-35.
97. Id. at 138-39.
98. Id. at 140-44.
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IV. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY IN THE
BUENOS AIRES LECTURES
These five lectures laid the groundwork for the sixth lecture, on
property, the most important for our purposes and, perhaps, the most
controversial in the course of Duguit’s presentation. Duguit noted that,
like other fundamental areas of law, property had become socialized.99
For Duguit, this meant two things. First, individual property was no
longer an individual right but had become a social function.100 Second,
aggregates of collective wealth protected by law were becoming more
numerous.101
Duguit first outlined the idea of property found in Roman law and
expressed in the Declaration of Rights of 1789, the Code Napoléon, and
the Argentine Civil Code.102 The consequences of this absolute
conception of property included lands being left without cultivation,
city lots without construction, vacant and unmaintained houses, and
unproductive capital goods.103 For Duguit, these consequences were
unacceptable in the modern context of social interdependence. Thus,
Duguit concluded for property: ―Property is no longer the subjective
right of the owner; it is the social function of the holder of wealth.‖104
Duguit found this new definition of property in the work of Auguste
Comte who, in 1850, wrote of the public function of each citizen and
the concomitant idea that property carries with it an ―indispensable
social function.‖105 Duguit also extrapolated this definition from Jean
Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil who wrote of the social functions of the
capitalist, owner, and trader.106 In addition to these authors, Duguit cited
four other works to develop the idea of the social-function norm of
property.107
Duguit was emphatic that the adoption of this definition of property
did not make him a redistributionist or someone analyzing property and
99. Id. at 148.
100. Id. at 148-49.
101. Id. at 149.
102. Id. at 152.
103. Id. at 153.
104. ―La propriété n’est plus le droit subjectif du propriétaire ; elle est la fonction sociale
du détenteur de la richesse.‖ Id. at 158.
105. ―[U]ne indispensable fonction sociale.‖ Id. at 159 (quoting COMTE, supra note 59, at
156).
106. Id. at 159-60.
107. Id. at 159 (citing ADOLPHE LANDRY, L’UTILITÉ SOCIALE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
INDIVIDUELLE (Paris, Société Nouvelle de Librairie et d’Edition 1901); MAURICE HAURIOU,
PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC 39 (1st ed., Paris, Sirey 1910) (2d ed., Paris 1916); HENRI HAYEM,
ESSAI SUR LE DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ ET SES LIMITES (Thèse pour le doctorat, Université de Dijon,
Faculté de Droit 1910); JOSEPH CHARMONT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT CIVIL 204 (A.
Collins ed., Paris 1912).
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ownership in the context of class struggle. He stated that he was not
advocating or predicting the disappearance of individual property. He
was only chronicling a modification in its nature that he had
observed.108
Duguit next addressed the scarcity of legislation effecting a socialfunction definition of property. In other words, there were no laws that
created obligations to farm uncultivated lands, to maintain houses, or to
make capital productive.109 Despite the lack of such legislation, Duguit
noted some aspects of the social-function norm attaching to property in
the case law of France.110 Furthermore, by the time of the second
edition, 1920, Duguit could point to some legislative examples as
well.111 These cases illustrated, in his view, property responding to the
common good.112 Recent cases prohibited land owners from erecting
screens, false chimneys, or excavating on their lands without reason.113
Scientific progress and social solidarity resulted in legislation
affecting property in another way. Laws requiring the running and
maintenance of electric and telephone lines without payment for
expropriation indicated that individual property was being limited by its
social function. Duguit reveled in the contradiction with Article 522,
section 1 of the Code Napoléon: ―Ownership of the land implies
ownership above and below it.‖114 Duguit’s final example of the
increasingly social function of property was taken from recent
developments concerning the church use of lands that formally had been
confiscated and owned by the state.115
Although Duguit’s views on property were concentrated in this sixth
lecture, these ideas were also woven through the course of the lectures.
For example, when addressing the two express rights under the
Declaration of Rights, liberty and property, Duguit repeated the central
idea another way: ―[P]roperty is not a right; it is a social function.‖116
Similarly, property came into the lectures again when Duguit discussed
the autonomy of will: ―The subjective right of property does not exist
more than the other rights. I will only say that if certain property is put
to a common use recognized as conforming to social solidarity, this use

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 160-61.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 165.
Id. at vii-xiii.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 167.
―La propriété du sol emporte la propriété du dessus et du dessous.‖ Id. at 168-70.
Id. at 171.
―Mais la propriété n’est pas un droit; elle est une fonction sociale.‖ Id. at 21.
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ought to be protected.‖117 Thus, although the theme of the social
function of property was most pronounced at the end of the lectures,
Duguit introduced these ideas from the beginning and repeated them
throughout the series of talks.
In sum, the series of lectures both described certain changes in law
that Duguit observed and argued for a different foundation for the
understanding of law and legal systems. Ideas of social solidarity and
social interdependence were used to wipe out the prevalent notion of
subjective rights and the autonomy of the will in maintaining private
law institutions such as contract and property. Duguit’s analysis and
prescriptive suggestions were increasingly specific and brought him
finally to a complete reconsideration of the nature of property, a
perspective he was to leave in Latin America after the lectures and
disseminate in Europe and North America.
V. THE BUENOS AIRES LECTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
DUGUIT’S WORK
Duguit’s lectures must also be placed in the context of his other
works, particularly his writings leading up to the lectures in Buenos
Aires in 1911. The work that established Duguit’s place as a national
and international academic was his two volumes on the State, l’État: le
droit objectif et la loi positive published in 1901 and l’État: les
gouvernants et les agents published in 1903.118 Duguit’s study and
exposition of the state and his lectures on the changes in private law are
complementary. Each work begins with the idea of social solidarity,
subjective rights, and juridical acts, but where l’État turned away from
law per se to examine governments, their structures and actions, the
lectures turn toward the private law to examine the effects of this
characterization on them. Thus, in their beginning sections these works
are similar in content, although the level of discourse and analysis is
deeper in the books and easier to follow in the lectures.
In passages from l’État, Duguit presented and questioned ideas that
later gained greater force and clarity of expression in the lectures. For
example, early in l’État, Duguit critiqued the current state of affairs
concerning the positive law by noting that all present legislation in
codes was based on the idea of the individual right, but rights were, in
117. ―Le droit subjectif de propriété n’existe pas plus que les autres droits. Je dirai
seulement que si des biens sont affectés à un but collectif reconnu conforme à la solidarité
sociale, cette affectation doit être protégée.‖ Id. at 72.
118. 1 LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT : LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA LOI POSITIVE (Paris, Fontemoing
& cie. 1901) [hereinafter 1 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT]; 2 LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT : LES GOUVERNANTS ET
LES AGENTS (Paris, Fontemoing & cie. 1903) [hereinafter 2 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT].
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his analysis, exclusively social.119 The themes later repeated in the
lectures are discussed at length, but somewhat more tentatively, in
l’État: social solidarity, solidarity as a division of work, the tendency of
groups and associations to increase in number in recent times, and the
lack of an essential difference between private and public law.120 The
text of l’État indicates that for these areas of thought, Duguit was again
strongly influenced by Comte’s ideas of social dynamism and
Durkheim’s treatise from 1893.121 As in the lectures, Duguit included a
section on the juridical act in his work on the state. The analysis is
similar; in l’État, Duguit critiqued the notion of subjective rights.122
Later, he began to question the nature of property and if the individual
will to create property was a subjective right of the individual. In l’État,
Duguit did not come to the social function solution he read in his
lectures, but determined that it was an objective power that implicated
the social rule of the time, a rule that changed as the elements of social
solidarity changed.123 This earlier work gives the reader a glimpse into
Duguit’s formative thought on property. It reveals, for example, Duguit
combining notions of ownership, property, and the social function
through the social role of the owner.124
Thus, l’État demonstrates Duguit’s earlier thought on many of the
same themes he later presented in his lectures: the failure of subjective
rights, limitations on law when read through a lens of social solidarity,
and underlying social function limitations on legal acts and rights. The
bulk, however, of the two volume work headed in a substantially
different direction from the lectures. Most of l’État addresses the nature
and will of government, the legislative will, the general nature of
positive law, nations and sovereignty, representative government,
parliaments, chiefs of state, government agents and delegation, and
decentralized governments.125
Overall, l’État provides little information on Duguit’s ideas on
property which were so well presented in the lectures. Nonetheless, the
reader of l’État observes some nascent ideas regarding property that
took fuller and clearer form in the lectures. To repeat the central
language on property by Duguit in 1911, we find in the lectures:

119. 1 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, supra note 118, at 13.
120. Id. at 16, 47, 58-62, 187.
121. For Comte, id. at 17; for Durkheim, id. at 23 (citing E. DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU
TRAVAIL SOCIAL (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1893)). For ideas of the social, Duguit also makes
considerable use of RUDOLF VON IHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1877). Id. at 170.
122. Id. at 141-43.
123. Id. at 152.
124. Id. at 153.
125. Id.; 2 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, supra note 118.
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―Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the social
function of the possessor of wealth.‖126
Ten years earlier, his formulations were less direct and more
reserved. At one point in l’État, Duguit wrote: ―Property is not a
subjective right, it implies an ensemble of juridically possible
intentions, indefinitely renewable; it is, in fact, a state.‖127
Repeating the same formula for interrogating the idea of property,
Duguit a bit later in the same study wrote: ―Property is not a subjective
right; it is a fact condition of objective powers, and this [is so], however
it might be constituted.‖128
Thus, by 1901, Duguit had clearly developed his critique of
subjective rights as related to property, and indeed, the law in general,
but he had not yet developed a clear way to express the social function
norm as it related to property.
L’État, however, also provides a window into the development of the
social-function norm of property. When discussing functionaries of the
state, Duguit noted that judges, professors, officers, and ministerial
officers like notaries held something like a property right in their
positions. The irremovable qualities of these offices made their holders
have a subjective right that was similar to a property right. The social
function of these positions made them important and irremovable. This
was done to protect the holders in their public function.129 Thus, it may
have been in the context of public servants and office holders that
Duguit first began to construct the social-function norm of property, or
at least, where he first began to connect the two ideas. The public
service link is certainly easier to see in this example when Duguit began
to construct property-based arguments for these state positions.
Duguit in l’État also distanced himself from socialism. While he
recognized that property or ownership created at least two class owners
and non-owners, Duguit did not believe that this necessarily led to class
struggle between the two.130 Thus, although the work that was to
establish Duguit’s position in the French and European intellectual
world did not advance his later ideas of the social-function norm of
property later found in the lectures, it indicated some of his nascent
ideas about subjective rights, property, and the social function that were
to come about in fuller form in 1911 in Buenos Aires.
126. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at v.
127. ―Le propriété n’est pas un droit subjectif; elle implique un ensemble de vouloirs
juridiquement possible, indéfiniment renouvelables; elle est en vérité un état.‖ 1 DUGUIT,
L’ÉTAT, supra note 118, at 205.
128. ―Le propriété n’est pas un droit subjectif; elle est un fait condition de pouvoirs
objectifs, et cela, quel que soit le mode de constitution de la propriété.‖ Id. at 210-11.
129. Id. at 581-82.
130. Id. at 205-06.
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Other works before the Buenos Aires lectures are even less useful in
tracing Duguit’s thought about property. In 1908, Duguit published a
series of three lectures given to the École des Hautes Études Sociales.
Similar themes of social solidarity and the problem of subjective rights
led to a discussion in his third lecture on classes and syndicalism.131
Duguit was again careful to distance himself from both socialists and
orthodox jurists.132 Nonetheless, these lectures from 1908 begin to
reveal the greater influence of Comte and Durkheim in Duguit’s thought
and writings, particularly as he built his ideas of social solidarity and
social interdependence.133
To complete a review of Duguit’s other works related to property,
we must also consider Duguit’s treatise on constitutional law. By its
second edition, this five-volume study published in the early 1920s
served as an opportunity for Duguit to bring his previous work together
and to provide newer insights and explorations of certain topic. Property
and its nature, of course came up at several points in the study. Duguit
repeated his assertions that property is not a subjective right and is a
social function. Indeed, he noted that since World War I, recent events
had proved him right as property owners, as capitalists, became social
producers invested with a social function.134 A portion of the treatise on
the relationship of the state to rights afforded Duguit the opportunity
both to repeat and to expand his central thesis concerning property.135
For example, Duguit analyzed in much greater depth than the Buenos
Aires lectures afforded him the problems stemming from the enshrining
of property as a right in the documents of the French Revolution,
including the Declaration of 1789 and the Declaration of 1793.136 This
work also gave Duguit the opportunity to discuss the social function of
property quite broadly noting that property has a social role, and that
limitations on property can only be explained adequately through ideas
of social utility.137 Duguit repeated much of his earlier work here: The
owner of property has a social function, and property has a social
function. Duguit noted that he first asserted this theory in his lectures in
1912.138 Duguit again recognized the main objection that there were few
statutes that compelled owners to put property to its social function, but

131. LÉON DUGUIT, LE DROIT SOCIAL, LE DROIT INDIVIDUEL,
L’ÉTAT (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1908) [hereinafter LE DROIT SOCIAL].
132. Id. at 1-5.
133. Id. at 24, 115.
134. DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 267.
135. Id. at 608-11.
136. Id. at 608-10.
137. Id. at 614, 618.
138. Id. at 618-19.
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responded with the examples he provided in the second edition of his
lectures as well as with some newer examples.139
The treatise on constitutional law added little to Duguit’s earlier
theory and assertions about the nature of property. If anything, they
confirm that he was comfortable in the statements he made concerning
property in the Buenos Aires lectures, and, in fact, he referred to them
as being the source for his views on the subject. One benefit of the
treatise was that it offered up-dated bibliographic materials on Duguit’s
idea of the social-function norm. In addition to confirming his reliance
on Comte, the treatise offers two other sources available to Duguit
concerning the social function of property that he did not cite in the
Buenos Aires lectures, works by Gide and Marguery.140 It is likely these
works also influenced, in some way, Duguit’s development of the
social-function norm.
VI. WRITERS ON PROPERTY WHO INFLUENCED DUGUIT’S
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY
There were also existing writers more narrowly focused on the
social-function norm of property or ownership available to Duguit as he
constructed his ideas on the topic. One likely influence was his friend
and colleague Raymond Saleilles.141 In writing about rights, Saleilles
had noted that an abuse of a right occurred when it was exercised
contrary to its economic and social function.
Saleilles wrote that ―from a social view point, any right is relative
and there are no rights, not even property rights, which are absolute.‖142
Saleilles was born in Beaune in 1855 and died in 1912. After studying
law in Paris and obtaining his agrégation in 1884, he taught in Dijon for
almost ten years before returning to teach in Paris.143 He was an open,
ardent Catholic and an advocate of reforms for women and workers. His
work often bridged French lay republican ideas and Catholic social
thought.144 Saleilles considered law to be a social science and stated that
the two elements of sociology were law and history.145 In this light,
Saleilles thought that doctrinal writings on the law should lead to
139. Id. at 620-24.
140. CHARLES GIDE, COURS D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE (Paris, Sirey 1909); E. MARGUERY, LE
DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ ET LE RÉGIME DÉMOCRATIQUE (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1906).
141. Evsey S. Rashba, “Consecrated Ignorance of Foreign Law”?, 39 CAL. L. REV. 364
(1951).
142. Id. at 364 n.44 (quoting and translating RAYMOND SALEILLES, ETUDE SUR LA THÉORIE
GÉNÉRALE DE L’OBLIGATION 371 (3d ed. 1914). The first edition was published in 1890.).
143. DHJF, supra note 31, at 694.
144. Id. at 695.
145. Id.
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changes in law by reflecting social facts and by keeping the collective
conscience of the time in mind. His influence on his friend Duguit can
be noted not only in Duguit’s work generally, but also when Duguit
turns to particular areas studied by Saleilles as examples, such as the
abuse of right, contracts of adhesion, and foundations.146
According to Duguit, his own construction of an idea of the socialfunction norm of property was built on the work of others. We know
that for the general proposition, Duguit cited and quoted Comte. 147 He
then pointed the reader to four other works by the following authors:
Aldolphe Landry, Maurice Hauriou, Henri Hayem, and Joseph
Charmont.148 Each work must be considered in Duguit’s construction of
the social-function norm of property, and each provides important
insights into the way Duguit came to the social-function definition.
The earliest work Duguit cited was Adolphe Landry’s L’utilité
sociale de la propriété individual.149 Despite its promising title in
relationship to our interests, the work is an economic analysis of
individual ownership that only addressed the relationship between
property and society in the broadest sense. The work is really about
profits from production, capitalization, productivity, the distribution of
wealth and economic inequality.150 At several points in the book,
Landry noted that private property created opposition between private
interests and social interests and that a change in the regime of private
ownership might produce social benefits.151 Although he theoretically
advocated a shift toward collective property, Landry argued against the
complete socialization of production.152 Duguit probably gave too much
credit to Landry in his construction of the social-function norm of
property. Some important ideas concerning property’s relationship to
society are found in Landry’s work, but Duguit’s ideas are clearly much
more definite and more fully constructed than Landry’s passing
comments. Despite the title of Landry’s work, it must have contributed
little to Duguit’s work in constructing the social function of property.
Duguit also cited the work of his intellectual sparring partner,
Maurice Hauriou, to construct his vision of the social-function norm of
property. Hauriou addressed property in a general discussion of rights in
his textbook on public law, Principes de droit public.153 Hauriou stated
146. Id.
147. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 158-59.
148. Id. at 159.
149. LANDRY, ADOLPHE, L’UTILITÉ SOCIALE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDIVIDUELLE (Paris, Société
Nouvelle de Librairie et d’Edition 1901).
150. Id. at xii, 407.
151. Id. at xii, 107-08, 148-49, 250-51, 405.
152. Id. at 130, 153, 250, 408-09.
153. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC (Paris, Sirey 1910).
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that rights were a combination of three elements: interest, power, and
function. The particular balance of these elements was worked out in
relationship to society.154 Indeed, Hauriou expanded the term ―function‖
at points in his writing to the term ―fonction sociale‖ and stated that this
aspect was also tied to public function.155 Hauriou used this threeelement scheme to analyze various rights such as being a witness and
voting. He left his discussion of the right of property, ―the most
individualist of rights,‖ for last.156
Concerning property, Hauriou stated that the element of function
was hidden.157 His work then explored the possibilities of finding the
function aspect of property. Like Duguit, Hauriou noted that the
legislature did not seem too concerned that owners of farm lands did not
cultivate them.158 Nonetheless, Hauriou argued, lands were subject to
equal inheritance and could not be subject to entails. Such lands were
widely distributed and were easily transferrable.159 Therefore, the
function element of property was provided by the market; all these
things were part of property’s function of economic production.160
Hauriou even drew on the term latifundia to drive home this economic
function of property.161 Hauriou used less common examples to
demonstrate further the economic or social function of property. These
included property subject to expropriation, Algerian concessions
requiring exploitation of the property, and literary and artistic rights.162
If Landry’s work pointed Duguit in the direction of the social,
Hauriou might have led Duguit in the direction of a function. Hauriou’s
work left off at defining property’s function as economic, rather than
fully social, and his reliance on the market and the economic function of
property within the market is a significant difference from Duguit’s
approach. Although he recognized that the function of rights could be,
at times, social or public, he did not extend this analysis to property.
Several other aspects, however, of Hauriou’s analysis are similar to
Duguit’s exposition on property. The theme of uncultivated farmland in
itself and in the face of legislative inaction was repeated by Duguit as a
possible critique of the social-function norm. Hauriou was not bothered
154. Id. at 36.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 38.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 38-39.
161. ―On ne redoute même pas, à raison de cette préoccupation, les latifundia qui se
vendraient très mal; chacun a intérêt a entretenir son domaine en rapport et il en est qui se
ruinent à cet entretien. Donc, tout a été fort habilement calculé pour que la fonction économique
de la propriété fût assurée par la seul jeu de la liberté.‖ Id. at 39.
162. Id.
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by the unproductive holding of land, because he settled on property
having an economic function and decided that other legislation ensured
that the market would handle such unproductive property. This,
however, created problems for Duguit’s concept of property as a social
function because uncultivated farmland produced social harms, even if
the market would eventually force the property into production.
It is likely that the third source listed by Duguit, a doctoral
dissertation of Henri Hayem was the most influential work on Duguit’s
construction of the social function of property. The work is a clear, indepth study of the topic, and even provided a summary of Duguit’s own
writings on the topic until 1910, the date of the dissertation. The
president of Hayem’s committee was Professor Delsandres, and the two
other examiners were Professors Eugene Gaudemet and Ernest
Champeaux.163
Hayem’s work linked ownership with a social function and
mentioned Duguit in connection with this idea. Hayem did not cite any
particular work of Duguit’s, but it seems clear that these ideas were
drawn from the passages on property from l’État discussed above. With
attribution to Duguit, Hayem wrote: ―Property is not an object of a
right. It the object of a duty. The owner exercises a social function.‖164
Hayem’s main point in the study was that the right to property was
becoming more and more relative and that an absolute right of property
should be rejected.165 The work attempted to chart this change through
French and European legal history from feudalism to the present.166 The
first section of the work addressed feudalism and concluded that it
provided a period of absence of limitations on property leading to
waste.167 Importantly, for the work and for Duguit’s conclusions,
Hayem noted the early conflation of public and private rights to
property.168
The second section of the work set out the shift from absolute to
relative rights to property.169 Here, Hayem provided a detailed study of
property rights during the French Revolution and how they became
absolute. Hayem paid particular attention to the sources of this principle

163. HENRI HAYEM, ESSAI SUR LE DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ ET SES LIMITES cover page (Thèse
pour le doctorat. Université de Dijon, Faculté de Droit. 1910).
164. ―Le propriété n’est pas l’objet d’un droit. C’ést l’objet d’un devoir. Le propriétaire
exerce une fonction sociale.‖ Id. at 425 (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at v.
166. Id. at v-vi.
167. ―De l’absence de limites à l’émiettement.‖ Id. at 3-163.
168. Id. at 16, 149, 162-63.
169. Id. at 165-439.
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and the competing schools of philosophical thought that attempted to
characterize property as in the period.170
Even in the period attributed to the creation of absolute rights,
Hayem found some evidence that some revolutionary thinkers were
planting a social-function norm for property. Hayem quoted the
revolutionary legal thinker Hentz to reveal this other trend about
property: ―Property is the fundamental social law, but the rights that it
gives should be seen less in relation to the one who enjoys them than [in
relation to] those in society for whose benefit it was created.‖171 This
passage gave Hayem the opportunity to discuss the idea of property
being instituted for social utility and how this idea conflicted with the
absolute nature of property constructed in the Declaration of the Rights
of Man.172
Just as Duguit moved from the Declaration to the Code, Hayem next
discussed the absolute nature of property under the Code civil stating
that ―[t]he French civil code represents the most comprehensive
expression of the absolutist theory of the right of property.‖173 He then
explored the underlying nature of property expressed in the code and
noted that Portalis’s view of property as a natural right was established
in line with the influences of Locke and Grenier.174 Portalis authored the
language creating the absolute right to property in the Code, found in
article 544, ―as the right to enjoy and to dispose of things in the most
absolute manner.‖175 Hayem asserted that while Portalis’s view, and
thus Locke’s view, established the natural law foundations of property
in the code, it was Rousseau’s social origins view that was used in
interpretation of the code provision on property after its enactment.176
Various examples of limitations on property by the state, such as
expropriation, taxation, and restrictions on succession, led Hayem to his
hypothesis of a relative right.177 He expressed the relative right theory
this way: ―It is, on the contrary, a relative doctrine, since property as a

170. Id. at 165-250.
171. ―La propriété est la première loi social, mais le droit qu’elle donne doit être envisagé
moins sous le rapport de celui qui en jouit que sous celui de la société pour l’utilité de laquelle
elle a été instituée.‖ Id. at 217-18 (citing Hentz, Rapport (1793), Arch. nat., AD, xviii, c. 326).
172. Id. at 218.
173. ―Le Code civil français représente l’expression la plus complète de la théorie
absolutiste du droit de propriété.‖ Id. at 250.
174. Id. at 52-253.
175. ―[C]omme le droit de jouir et de disposer des choses à la manière la plus absolue.‖ Id.
at 252 (citing Exposé de motifs du projet du Code Civil, tit. II, liv. II in 8 LOCRÉ, LA
LEGISLATION CIVILE DE LA FRANCE 151).
176. Id. at 253.
177. Id. at 260-98.
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private right finds itself limited by property as a public right and is
subordinated to the latter.‖178
Keeping to the philosophical trends concerning property throughout
its history, Hayem next turned to the different schools of thought related
to property as of 1910.179 This approach provided him the opportunity
to discuss the views of, among others, Bentham, Mill, Savigny, Ihering,
Comte, socialist thinkers, the Catholic Church, and Herbert Spencer.180
At several points in the text, Hayem drew the connection of property
and its social function. For example, after citing a passage by Ihering on
expropriation, Hayem wrote: ―Thus, the right of property, like all other
private rights, is not a natural right, not an individual right, but a social
right.‖181
Hayem also noted the development of a school that attacked these
questions from a different or newer manner in terms of property’s
relationship to the state. Here, the main influences were Comte, SaintSimon, Spencer, Durkheim, Courcelle-Seneuil.182 His summary of this
section led Hayem to ask a question in similar terms to Duguit: ―If,
then, property imposes a social function, what is the importance of this
social function?‖183
After noting various legislative limitations on property, Hayem then
asked the political question of the day: does all this lead to socialism?184
He answered by saying that it was difficult to see the future, and
although certain elements of the social platform had come to pass, such
as the expropriation of church holdings, he believed the means of
production would stay in private hands.185 He then discussed the
expansion of social property (propriété sociale) in this light.186
Nonetheless, like Duguit and others working on a middle way between
absolute property rights and socialism, Hayem indicated that a socialfunction norm was not necessarily the path to socialism: ―And so, a
point to be emphasized again: the possibility of socializing property,
without thereby adopting socialist doctrines.‖187
178. ―C’est, au contraire, une doctrine relativiste, puisque la propriété de droit privé s’y
trouve limitée par la propriété de droit public et même subordinée à cette dernière.‖ Id. at 321.
179. Id. at 325-56.
180. Id. at 325-47.
181. ―Ainsi, le droit de propriété, comme tous les autres droits privés, est non un droit
naturel, un droit individuel, mais un droit social.‖ Id. at 333 (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 347-56.
183. ―Si, en effet, la propriété impose une fonction sociale, quelle sera l’importance de
cette fonction sociale?‖ Id. at 355.
184. Id. at 418.
185. Id. at 418-19.
186. Id. at 420-22.
187. ―Enfin, un point est à retentir encore: c’est la possibilité de socialiser la propriété,
sans adopter pour cela les doctrines socialistes.‖ Id. at 438.
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It is at this point in his study, near its end, that Hayem offers
Duguit’s analysis and conclusions about property presented at the
beginning of this section.188 The idea of the social function of
ownership was advanced by Hayem through brief discussion of the idea
of the owner as social functionary (foncionnaire social).189 Hayem
concluded his work with ideas that very closely follow what Duguit was
to propose. In part, he concluded: ―And so, from fight to fight, and from
transformation to transformation, one moves toward a form of society
where private property really is the object of a social function.‖190
In Hayem’s dissertation we find many of the ideas on property
Duguit presented in his lecture. They are set out clearly and often in
substantial detail. Indeed, Hayem’s summary of Duguit’s work on
property until the date of the dissertation is an important link between
the two authors. Hayem, the student, read and cited Duguit, and, in turn,
Duguit, and established professor, cited Hayem, author of a wellexecuted dissertation.
Of the works cited by Duguit, Hayem’s dissertation is by far the
closest and fullest source for the philosophical background on property
and the rise of property as an absolute right out of the French
Revolution, the important observations concerning the public and
private law in relation to the conception of property, and the fullest and
most similar statements linking property to a social function. In
Hayem’s dissertation, the reader finds what must have been a useful and
influential source in Duguit’s lectures.
The final work Duguit cited as contributing to his construction of the
idea of the social function norm was by Joseph Charmont. In a book
dedicated to Salielles, Charmont tackled the same general topic of
Duguit’s lectures. Charmont’s approach was, however, quite different.
Charmont focused on changes in the civil law in the areas of marriage,
family, and children. The work also addressed property in a chapter
entitled ―The right of private property since the code civil: More and
more restrictions on the right of the owner.‖191 Far from expounding a
social-function norm of property, Charmont linked these restrictions to
the fact that owners did not live alone, but must co-exist with others.192
Over the next thirty or so pages of the book, Charmont provided a list of
examples where the absolute use of property is limited by some sort of
188. Id. at 425-28.
189. HAYEM, supra note 163, at 426-28.
190. Id. at 438 (emphasis in original) (―Et ainsi, de combat en combat, et de transformation
en transformation, on s’acheminerait vers une forme de société où la propriété privée serait
vraiment l’objet d’une fonction sociale . . .‖).
191. JOSEPH CHARMONT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT CIVIL 201 (A. Collins ed., Paris
1912).
192. Id.
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restriction.193 His examples included: maintaining walls, garbage
dumps, unhealthy releases of materials, piles of dirt from landslides,
construction waste, dangerous animals,194 brothels, and excavations
without reason.195 He used these examples to demonstrate that
ownership is not absolute, as propounded by Ihering, and that when
such uses are balanced, as in the doctrinal writings of Demolombe,
Aubry and Rau, Blondel, and Baudry-Lancantinerie, the public use or
purposes usually won the day.196 Charmont continued the book with
more in-depth discussions of building restrictions that Paris and other
large cities had since 1902,197 restrictions on cultivation,198
expropriations,199 mining,200 and water rights, particularly in
relationship to their use for industrial power.201 Charmont’s work is, in
essence, an inventory of limitations on the use of property. He provided
no general conclusion tying these restrictions to public use or a social
function for property. Thus, the work provided plenty of examples,
some of which might have supported a shift towards a social-function
norm of property, but other than the general observation that property
was no longer absolute, the work gave no theoretical guidance,
language, or suggestions to Duguit for the construction of his new
characterization of property.
Of the four works cited, Hayem’s dissertation must have been, by
far, the most influential as Duguit sat down to write his lecture on
property for Buenos Aires. Hayem’s historical and philosophical
analysis must have been particularly useful to Duguit. Hayem, like
Duguit, linked property to a social function, without the directness of
expression one finds Duguit’s words. The other works cited indicate
that various parts of Duguit’s concept of the social-function norm were
being developed and thought about by others at the time. The works of
Landry, Hauriou, and Charmont played supporting roles in the
construction of the idea. Hauriou tied property to a social function that
was economic. Charmont provided numerous examples indicating that
property had been restricted by various social demands.
Two other works were likely used by Duguit in the construction of
his theory. These works were not mentioned in the published version of
the lectures, but were cited in 1923 when Duguit published his ideas
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 201-32.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 212-16.
Id. at 217-19.
Id. at 220-32.
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about property in the Traité de droit constitutionnel.202 For works
pointing to the social foundations of individual property published
before his book of the Buenos Aires lectures, Duguit cited Charles Gide
and E. Marguery in addition to the works by Landry and Hayem.
Gide’s work provided a broad study of political economy for
university students.203 In his discussion of ways of acquiring property
and other general principles concerning property, Gide briefly touched
on property’s social utility.204 He wrote: ―Only if such is the basis of the
right of property, it follows that the individual is not the owner for
himself, but for society, in that property is, in both the most august and
literal sense, a public function.‖205 Within this context, Gide examined
the prevailing views of property and described how socialist and
communist structures consider property.206 He also spent considerable
space to discuss owners of agricultural land (propriétares fonciers) and
their place in political economics.207
Gide’s contribution to Duguit’s construction of the social function
norm of property must have been limited. He repeated the ideas of
public function and social utility for property in its relationship to
society, but did not expand on these ideas in a way that would help
Duguit build his theory. Gide’s work was, at best, general support for
the ideas Duguit developed fully in his lectures.
The second extant work Duguit cited in the constitutional treatise of
1923 but did not cite in the publication of the lectures was a book by
Marguery on the right of property and its relationship to democracy.208
In addition to the work of Comte, this is another early work cited by
Duguit that used the phrase ―social function‖ (fonction sociale), which
Marguery used in connection with the cultivation of land.209 Marguery’s
main concern was to move property towards serving democratic
institutions, and in studying the possibilities for property, he recognized
many of the recent changes and restrictions on property.210 Thus,
writing in 1906, Marguery thought that it was ―time to investigate the
social advantages of the right of property.‖211
202. DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 626.
203. GIDE, supra note 140.
204. Id. at 468.
205. ―Seulement si tel est le fondement du droit de propriété, il en résulte alors que
l’individu n’est pas propriétaire pour lui-même mais pour la Société, que la propriété est, dans le
sens le plus auguste et le plus littéral á la fois de ce mot, une fonction publique.‖ Id. at 468
(emphasis in original).
206. Id. at 465-522.
207. Id. at 523-72.
208. MARGUERY, supra note 140.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 181.
211. ―Il est temps de rechercher les avantages sociaux du droit de propriété.‖ Id. at 29.
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Like Duguit, Marguery saw problems in the absolutist construction
of property rights. Marguery criticized the present constructions of
property rights where every owner of property considered himself ―not
as the holder of social capital, but as a king of an independent province
where he uses and abuses it at his whim.‖212
In Marguery’s view, legislative change was not necessary to effect
change because under recent French law, the owner of property was
already far from being someone who enjoyed absolute rights.213
Marguery, like his contemporaries, rallied examples to demonstrate that,
in some situations, the private interest had to yield to the general
interest.214 His examples included water rights; forests; taxes on wine,
alcohol, and tobacco; municipal rules requiring the maintenance of
property, rights to light and air, and construction restrictions.215 The
work then presents short chapters treating some other areas where
property was pushed in the service of democracy: hunting, fishing,
mining, forests, waters, and farmland.216 The final portion of the book
addressed early land reform efforts to limit the size of large estates in
favor of smaller estates. His examples here were drawn from European
law and legislation, but they reveal the then nascent possibility of tying
social function to agrarian reform that was to flourish later in the
century.217
It is interesting that Duguit did not cite Marguery in the publication
of his lectures as a source for the social function of property. Although
the work tried to move property in the direction of democratic
institutions, it did so by generally asserting the social function of the
property in various contexts. Indeed, Marguery appears to have been
one of the first writers, along with Comte, to use the term social
function in connection with property. His rejection of absolutist
constructions of property and his use of examples to demonstrate the
supremacy of the public interest concerning property rights were
significant steps in ideas Duguit later presented in the Buenos Aires
lectures.
Duguit’s social-function theory of property was the product of
several French scholars who thought and wrote about property in the
first decade or so of the twentieth century. Duguit was able to construct
his clear and forceful exposition of the social-function norm out of a
212. ―Le propriétaire d’une terre, d’une mine, d’une chute d’eau se considère non comme
le dépositaire d’un capital social, mais comme le roi d’une province indépendente dont il use et
abuse à son gré.‖ Id. at 42.
213. Id. at 85.
214. Id. at 89.
215. Id. at 85-87.
216. Id. at 95-140.
217. Id. at 141-80; MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 16, at 219-27.
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body of work that had recently developed. In many ways, Duguit’s
contribution was to synthesize these ideas and craft them into his own
unified approach to modern property. These were fresh and new ideas
with a very short intellectual history. New sociological approaches to
law and methods based on the observation of law in action in recent
decisions by courts and legislatures led to Duguit’s construction of the
social-obligation norm. Duguit credited this approach to the work of
others. He was a careful and sometimes generous scholar attributing his
idea to the many contemporary works around him. Duguit did not
construct the social-function norm of property out of whole cloth. He
did, however, give it a clarity of form built from various sources, and he
strongly advocated its descriptive utility. His Buenos Aires lectures
were the most coherent expression of the idea, and their publication can
properly be thought of as a milestone in the history of the idea. The
lectures, because of their author, their clarity in advocating an idea, and
their wide availability in French, English, and Spanish were key to the
spread of the social-function norm of property.
VII. BEYOND DUGUIT AND THE SOCIAL-FUNCTION NORM:
SOCIAL PROPERTY
As Duguit viewed the social-function norm as a limitation on private
property and as a defining aspect of private property itself, other
thinkers of the period were using the idea of ―the social‖ to expand
traditional ideas of what property was.218 These thinkers created a
modern, broad conception of ―social property‖ to mean ―security‖ for
workers through mandated contributions to a government system
providing minimum funds for benefits such as pensions or social
housing.219 These new concepts of social property went far beyond the
ideas of limiting unused land or even socializing land through agrarian
reform programs. The conception of this kind of property was not yet
known in the eighteenth century or even during most of the nineteenth
century.220 It was the kind of property labeled ―new property‖ by
Charles Reich in a well-known and influential article published by Yale
Law Journal in 1964.221
218. ROBERT CASTEL & CLAUDINE HAROCHE, PROPRIÉTÉ PRIVÉE, PROPRIÉTÉ SOCIALE,
PROPRIÉTÉ DE SOI: ENTRETIENS SUR LA CONSTRUCTION DE L’INDIVIDU MODERNE 76-79 (Paris,
Fayard 2001) (citing HENRI HATZFELD, DU PAUPÉRISME À LA SECURITÉ SOCIALE (A. Colin ed.,
Paris 1971) as the best study of this type of social property).
219. Robert Castel, Emergence and Transformations of Social Property, 9
CONSTELLATIONS 324 (2002).
220. CASTEL & HAROCHE, supra note 218, at 44.
221. JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, HISTORIE DU DROIT DES BIENS 341 (Paris, Economica 2008);
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). ―Property is not a right, but a
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Although much more assertive in their socialization of property and
in their expansive definition of property, these ideas were not more
recent expansions from the work of Duguit. This social property was
not individual property limited by social function following Duguit’s
view, but was rather an analogue of private property for non-owners.222
Despite the collective burden placed on this type of property, it was not
social property in the sense of a socialist call to reapportion the products
of work.223 Instead, like Duguit’s view, this kind of social property
sought to strike a middle way between capitalist liberalism and
collectivism.224
Perhaps the most eminent of the thinkers and writers to advance this
notion of ―social property‖ was Durkheim himself.225 As Castel and
Haroche have pointed out, there was most likely a link between
Durkheim’s creation of the field of sociology and this new kind of
property.226 For Durkheim, the modern conditions of the division of
labor, urbanization, and the wage-earning society led to the need for
social solidarity.227 The proper role of the state, then, was to maintain
social cohesion.228 This kind of social property was a late nineteenthand early twentieth-century response to the modern pauperism of the
nineteenth century.229 Although eighteenth-century precursors like
Locke and Rousseau hinted at the relationships between property, the
individual, and society, this notion of social property was produced as a
response to nineteenth-century economic and social conditions.230
This idea of social property was a parallel and related development
to Duguit’s ideas about the social-function norm. As early as 1884,
Alfred Fouillée’s La propriété sociale et la démocratie advanced this
kind of social property by suggesting that the state could demand from
workers minimum amounts so that a proletarian class of individuals
sentenced to servitude and prone to rebellion would not form.231
Considering its title and its relation to Duguit’s and our topic, it is
deliberate construction of society.‖ Id. at 771; see Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at
the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 2001-50 (2009). For the impact of
Reich’s work, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 893 (2009); see also
Karen M. Tani, Fleming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New
Property,‖ 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379 (2008).
222. CASTEL & HAROCHE, supra note 218, at 74.
223. Id. at 76.
224. Id. at 76-79.
225. Id. at 80.
226. Id. at 100-01.
227. Id. at 80.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id. at 73.
230. Id. at 14-24, 53-55.
231. Castel, supra note 219, at 324.
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noteworthy that Duguit did not use this work as a source for his ideas of
the social-function norm. Fouillée’s work is similar to Duguit’s in its
rejection of socialism and in its attempt to find a middle way between
purely capitalist and purely socialist property.232 Fouillée characterized
this as property’s individual and social function.233 For Fouillée, both
forms of property lead to democracy and in this context he made an
early use of the term ―propriété sociale‖ or ―social property.‖234 From
this point, Fouillée critiqued socialism but then moved on to an in-depth
analysis of social assistance programs, the right to work, and
insurance.235 Instead of moving back to the question of property in
relationship to these elements, Fouillée next addressed the democratic
process, universal suffrage, and the place of education in
democracies.236 Thus, considering its early treatment of the topic, its
mention of social property, and its similar middle-way approach to
capitalism and socialism, it is somewhat odd that Duguit did not list
Fouillée work as a source for his ideas of the social-function norm.
Perhaps Duguit found Fouillée went too far in his description of social
property and the programmatic aspects of property that Fouillée’s work
advocated. Even among writers putting forth a middle ground between
the individual and the social, there were differences in approach,
analysis, and goals that may have led to their exclusion from Duguit’s
initial works.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Duguit was the most articulate speaker on behalf of the
social-obligation norm of property and his position as a well-respected
law professor aided in his efforts to disseminate the idea, he was not the
only person involved in the construction and study of the idea. Until
now, Henri Hayem’s work has been underappreciated in the
development of the idea. Much of Duguit’s approach and analysis of the
idea of property’s social function followed Hayem’s work. Duguit was
not a plagiarist; he cited Hayem as one of his sources. Nonetheless,
Hayem should be restored as a central influence on Duguit’s thought
and as one of the main proponents of the idea of the social-function
norm.
Other contemporary thinkers on property and its social aspects also
left their mark on Duguit’s work and formulation. A constellation of
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

ALFRED FOUILLÉE, LA PROPRIÉTÉ SOCIALE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE vi (1884).
Id. at v.
Id. at ix.
Id. at 1-153.
Id. at 155-282.

226

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

thinkers including Saleilles, Landry, Hauriou, and Charmont also
shaped Duguit’s work on property. Still other writers, such as Comte,
Durkheim, and Gide, provided modern, general approaches to observing
and writing about law in a social context. They added to Duguit’s
understanding of rights, property, and the social function.
The social-function norm influenced ideas of property around the
world since its formulation in the early twentieth century. It was to have
profound importance in European and Latin American constitutional
thought. In the United States, the idea has experienced a recent rebirth
as an alternative discourse to a long tradition of absolute property rights.
The social-function norm of property, as expounded and advanced by
Duguit, Hayem, and others, continues as an important theory of
property today, especially as property rights are defined and enshrined
in constitutions or in civil codes. A full understanding of the idea’s
historical development and of its proper attribution is essential for
further scholarship in the field. Such an understanding is also essential
for those who would seek to implement the social-function norm of
property in legal systems or use it as a point of departure for critiquing
legal systems in which absolute rights-based approaches are dominant.

